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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in ordering blood tests.22 The need for blood tests in paternity and
similar proceedings seems greater than the need for medical exam-
ination in personal injury suits.
The minority view which obtained in a few states2 and in the
federal courts,2 4 until the new rules of procedure, denied the power
to order physical examination, apparently because of lack of precedent
and a desire to protect plaintiff's right of privacy.25 The reasons
have been rejected by most courts and commentators; 26 but courts
following the minority view will probably refuse to order blood tests
without a statute or court rule as authority. J.R.D.
EVIDENCE SHOWING ABSENCE OF MOTIVE
Pollard was charged with conspiracy to commit perjury by having
witnesses falsely testify that they saw the deceased execute a note
upon which Pollard founded a claim against the deceased's estate. The
lower court excluded evidence that the note was genuine. Held, the
exclusion was reversable error. The evidence was competent as tending
to establish that no motive for the crime alleged existed. Pollard v.
State, 29 N.E. (2d) 956 (Ind. 1940.)
Where direct evidence is in conflict as to whether the accused com-
mitted a crime, or the evidence is circumstantial upon that issue,
motive is material. Hardin v. State, 211 Ala. 656, 101 So. 442 (1924);
People v. Lewis, 275 N. Y. 33, 9 N. E. (2d) 765 (1937). In such eases,
evidence tending to substantiate the existence or nonexistence of mo-
tive is relevant and admissible as circumstantially bearing upon the
intent or identity of the offender. People v. Durkin, 330 Ill. 394, 161
N. E. 739 (1928); Hall v. State, 37 Okla. Cr. 4, 255 Pac. 716 (1927).
The relevancy of facts so adduced hinges upon the general character
of the motive prompting the crime. 2 WIGMORE, EvDmENCE (3d ed.
1940) §§ 389-392. The fact submitted, however, must be within the
probable knowledge of the accused since it otherwise could not have
effected his motives. Potter v. State, 60 N. D. 183, 233 N. W. 650
(1930); Marabile v. State, 89 Ga. 425, 15 S. E. 453 (1892) (apparent
oportunity to know); of. Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492 (1871) (actual
knowledge). The basis for the admission of this kind of evidence is
221ndiana follows the majority view. South Bend v. Turner, 156
Ind. 418, 60 N.E. 271 (1901). From the language used there
it seems very unlikely that Indiana courts would refuse to order
blood tests.
23 Richardson v. Nelson, 221 Ill. 254, 77 N.E. 583 (1906); Stack v.
N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N.E. 686 (1900).
24Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). Subsequent to
the decision in the principal case the Supreme Court in Sibbach
v. Wilson Co., 9 U.S.L. Week 4131 (U.S. 1941), cited supra note 20,
held that to compel a party to submit to physical examination is
not an invasion of a substantive right and, therefore, federal rule
35 (a) does not transcend the enabling act.
25 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
20 See cases cited supra note 15; 8 WiGoRE, EVIDRNCE (3d ed. 1940)
§ 2220.
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the rational connection between motive and action of which the jury
is presumed to have sufficient knowledge to infer the probability of
one from the other. Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 671, 8 S. E. 584
(1889). The absence of motive raises the inference that action is
improbable. People v. Kepford, 52 Cal. App. 508, 199 Pac. 64 (1921);
State v. Santino, 186 S. W. 976 (Mo. 1916). Thus, if the note in the
principal case was in fact genuine, the jury might well infer that
Pollard probably would not conspire to produce perjured testimony to
that effect. The excluded evidence seems to have sufficient probative
value to justify a holding that its exclusion was error.
N. C. B.
WIRE-TAPPING EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE UNLESS BOTH
PARTIES CONSENT
Defendants were convicted on evidence gained by recording tele-
phone conversations between/ them and an informer who gave his
consent that federal agents record the conversations over an extension
phone. Held, this is illegal wire-tapping and the evidence gained
thereby is inadmissible. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F(2d) 888,
(C.C.A.2d, 1940), cert. denied, 61 S. Ct. 41 (1940).
Tapping wires to gain evidence to detect and convict criminals
does not violate the Federal Constitution. Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). But the Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1103
(1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1940), renders any information
gained in wire-tapping by federal agents or private persons inadmis-
sibl6 in evidence. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). A
refusal to allow defendant to examine the prosecution to determine the
extent to which the case is based on facts gained by wire-tapping is
reversible error. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This
ban on wire-tapping extends to both intrastate and interstate communi-
cations. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). In all these
cases interception was done secretly, without the knowledge or consent
of either communicant. In the principal case, however, the party
initiating the conversation authorized the wire-tapping. The Com-
munications Act allows only the "sender" to authorize an interception,
but the court solves this case by construing "sender" to mean both
communicants. It explains that since every telephone conversation is
antiphonal, the parties to it are alternately sender and receiver, and
that to allow one party to forfeit the other's privilege would defeat
the purpose of the act and the privilege granted. This result makes
illegal an effective method of crime detection and law enforcement,
but the over-riding policy expressed by the Court in the Nardone cases,
that of protecting individual liberties and the right Of privacy, must
prevail. In a concurring opinion, Judge A. Hand proposes that Con-
gress act to allow police officers restricted use of wire-tapping. Pro-
fessor Wigmore suggests the use of warrants, issued on oath as search
warrants are issued. 8 WIGMORE, EIDMENCE, (3d ed. 1940) § 2184b.
See Note (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 863; N. Y. CONST. (1938) Art. I, § 12.
W. M. B.
